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TOWARDS

NEGOTIABILITY
BY

JOHN

OF

GOODS

MERLO

It has been uniformly held as a rule supported by
imposing precedent in the common-law field of Sales of
Goods that a buyer acquires no other or greater title
possesaside from statutes,
had, that,
than the seller
sion alone does not give the possessor the right or
party to the
power to dispose of the goods to a third
of the true owner. I
prejudice of the title
admitted to the
courts an exception is
But by all
that the owner of the goods may
above rule to the effect
to sell
or
clothe the possessor with apparent authority
found to be
parties
apparent ownership, whereby third
bona fide purchasers for value without notice from the
owner in
any
over the original
possessor will prevail
action wherein such owner seeks to assert his title to
the goods. 2 The equitable maxim, "Where one of two innocent persons must suffer by the act of a third, he,
by whose negligence it happened, must be the sufferer,"
3
This
is sometimes used to reach the same results.
maxim, however, has often been criticized as vague and
impossible of precise applicaticn, serving, perhaps, as
a good restatement of what has been decided but as no
cases, however,
In all
for the decision.
accurate basis
decided by application of the
that have been correctly
above mentioned exceptions to the primary rule of property mentioned above, something more than possession
is necessary in the intermediate party, as a bill of
sale signed by the original owner placed in the hands
of the possessor or words or acts of the owner which
would reasonably lead the third party to believe that
the possessor is either an authorized agent to sell or
party
before the third
the holder of the legal title,
4
is allowed to prevail over the real owner.
apit
From a search of the primary authorities
to
made
been
has
exception
another
that
pears, however,
the rule of property law that a buyer acquires no other
Metropolitan Fi1 - Henderson Baker Lmbr. Co. v. Headley, 247 Ala. 681, 26 So. 2d 8
nance Corp. of America v. Morf, 42 Cal. App. 2d 756, 109 P. 2d 969; Church v. Mellville, 17 Or. 413, 21 P. 387; Moore v. Long, 33 So. 2d 6, 1947.
2 - Kearby v. Western States Securities Co. 31Ariz. 104, 250P. 766; Uniform Sales Act,
Section 23.
3 - Cal. Div. Code 3542; Conklin v. Benson, 159 Cal. 785, 116 P. 34.
4 - Pickering v. Busk, 15 East 38, 1812 Nixon v. Brown, 57 N.H. 34, 1876 Pool v.
George, 209 S. W. 2d 209; see Vold, Cases on Sales, 1949 Ed. Pg. 466 nt. 14.

The Courts have
or greater title than the seller had.
not put this exception, as yet, in the form of a rule,
nor have they in fact openly admitted that they were
or
ownerauthority
in
waters
beyond apparent
treading
ship, 5 yet from an analysis of the facts of recent decisions of some courts-, it appears that the possessor
of goods with no indicia of ownership nor apparent
authority
to sell
who received
the
goods in
pursuance
of a contract to sell has been given the power to invest
title
of
his
transferrar
in
a bona fide
purchaser
for
value
without
notice
of
the
rights
of
the
original
6
party.
Perhaps the most common and clearest illustration
of
an owner being
deprived
of
his
goods is
the situation where he delivers to B who is in the business of
selling that and similar merchandise.
A sale by B in
this case not in accordance with authority given or
even where no authority to sell is given would place
the title in the bona fide purchaser for value without
notice.
The rule is well stated by Justice Field in
an obiter:
"The delivery of goods to a merchant engaged in the sale of articles of a similar kind, is
such evidence of
bestowal
of
the right
to dispose
of
the same as to protect the purchaser from the possessor. " 7 ' There is no question that under such facts
there is something more than possession in the intermediate party that precludes the original owner from
the recovery of his goods or their value.
A closer case, however, is presented when the
intermediate
party
acts
both in
the
capacity
of
seller
of his
own goods and as bailee
of
g ods for others.
These cases usually do not involve delivery of possession
in
pursuance
of a contract
to sell,
but
do indicate
the
extent
of
the rules
of
apparent
authority
or
apparent
ownership.
In
Kastner
v.
Andrews,8 where the
farmerts
grain
was bailed
to the elevator
operator,
who was also
in
the
business
of
selling
his
own grain,
a purchaser
from the
elevator
operator
with no actual
5 - See as an illustration of this point Blount v. Bainbridge, 79 Ga. App. 99, 53 S.E.
2d 122, Apr. 1949.
6 - Close on the facts as to whether there was more than possession, see Jesse Meadows
v. Hampton Live Stock Conr. Co., 55 Cal. App. 2d 634, 131 P. 591, 1942. Here the
original seller refused to give a bill of sale as required by the Ag. Code, wishing to reserve title until he received cash. The bona fide purchaser from the

possessor prevailed.
7 - Wright v. Soloman, 19 Cal. 64.
8 - Kastner v. Andrews, 49 N.D. 1059,

194 N.W. 824,

1923.

was
bailment
of
transaction
the specific
knowledge of
was held
It
bailor.
to the
conversion
in
liable
held
ownerupon apparent
rely
not
could
the purchaser
that
as a grain
since
of the farmer,
by the act
created
ship
did
Co.
which the Elevator
he knew the manner in
dealer
A reverse holding was made in
business generally.
9
where it was
Kearby v. Western States Securities Co.,
contended that even if there were no authority to sell,
the Security Co. that allowed the automobile dealer to
display the car for sale purposes was bound by a sale
without
value
for
purchaser
to a good faith
thereof
seems, on
it
distinguished,
be
may
Such cases
notice.
as apparserve
will
which
that
of
knowledge,
the score
another.
for
insufficient
being
one
ownership for
ent
informed.
better
by the owner accomsigned
of
sale
a bill
And if
was withheld, the
title
although
possession,
the
panies
prevails.10
possessor
the
from
purchaser
fide
bona
to sell
ownership or authority
Whether apparent
whether
question
same
the
purposes
practical
for
exists,
Keegan
In
closer.
still
get
may
estoppel is present,
lambs were bought from the
v. Kaufman Bros. et. al. 1
faith and without notice that
good
in
possessor for cash
The original
possessor.
the
title was in other than
received from
was
cash
until
title
vendor here reserved
not rewas
cash
The
a check given by the possessor.
originThe
waived.
same
the
of
nor was receipt
ceived,
court
the
loaded,
were
sheep
by as the
al vendor stood
intitle,
his
by that fact estopping him from asserting
by
created
was
sisting that an "indicia of ownership"
by.
standing
the seller
seems the court might have been on sounder
ownership" were based on the fact
of
"indicia
if
footing
selof
the business
to one in
sheep were delivered
that
rebuttal
same
But to that reasoning the
ling sheep.
might have been used as was used in Kastner v. Andrews,
supra. 12
It

To
9

ascribe

apparent

authority or

ownership

to

a

- Cited in Note 2.

10 - Dudley v. Lovins, 220 S.W. 2d 978.
11 - 68 Cal. App. 2d 197, 156 P. 2d 261, 1945. See also Meadows case cited in Note 6.

"The purchaser likewise know$ the character of
12 - Citation, Note 8. The Court said:
the business transacted by the warehouseman (intermediate party) and knows that
in the ordinary conduct of such business he will both purchase . . . This carries

notice that his right to sell is limited

. . .

Hence no reason is apparent for

making an exception to the rule of "caveat emptor"."

seller
by word or act must mistransaction
the original
There is no poslead the third party to his prejudice.
itive duty upon the original party. 13 The bona fide purchaser here was not made to believe that the possessor
was owner by any act, admission or conduct of the original owner; he depended upon his own knowledge of the
It is said to be well settled that "standing by"
facts.
for estoppel, 14 yet the cases
creates a good basis
examined do not reanalyze the situation with reference
precedent and
to the theory of estoppel, but merely cite
authority for support.
Aside from apparent ownership would the California
case referred to in some detail above have been decided
Perhaps an answer may be got from decisions
the same?
in other jurisdictions to follow. 15
A recent case that bombards the facts with various
the bona fide
an attempt to protect
legal theories in
purchaser from a possessor who received the goods by
is Sullivan Co. v. Larson,
virtue
of a contract to sell
sell.er sought to
a Nebraska decision. 16 The original
sold them to B,
Plaintiff
replevy 28 head of cattle.
cash
was to pass until
who gave a bad check; no title
Defendant bought the cattl.e at auction
was received.
conducted on behalf of B, and judgment went for the
defendant.
The court, relying upon possession alone
allowed the bona fide purof ownership,
as indication
chaser to prevail.
The court cites Parr v. Helfrich, 17 really no
authority for the present decision, for there a certified check was involved, the original transaction held
to be one where the title of the goods was meant to pass
for the certified check, it being considered the equivaof cash.
The Uniform Sales Act, Section 23, was
lent
cited, the court opining that plaintiff had allowed the
13 - Estoppel by silence, Black's Law Dict, wherein it is defined as: "A kind of equitable estoppel arising where a person under a duty to another to speak refrains
from so doing, and thereby leads the latter to believe in the existence of a state

of facts, in reliance on which he acts to his prejudice; " Farmers' State Bank of
Jefferson v. Jordan, 61 Okl. 15, 160 P. 53, 54.
14 - Void, Cases on Sales, 1949, Pg. 55, Note 63.
15 - Compare Keegan et al. v. Lenzie, 171 Or. 194, 135 P. 2d 717, for stricter view.
But see Mogul Transportation Co. v. Larison, 181 P. 2d 139, 1947, decided after
the Keegan case. A cash sale was intended, and the court in a dictum stated:
"Title to property does not pass until payment, and, if the buyer has taken possession without paying the price, the seller, unless he has waived concurrent payment, may reclaim the property if, in the interim, rights of innocent third persons have not intervened. "
16 - 149 Neb. 97, 30 N.W. 460, 1948.
17 - 108 Neb. 801, 189 N.W. 281, 1922.

possessor
to hold
himself
out
as owner,
thereby
being
precluded
from asserting
his
title.
But the possessor
in
fact
had no more than possession
of the cattle,
the
bill
of lading,
which was not
negotiable,
of course, in
his possession reciting the plaintiff both as consignor
and consignee.
It may be, though unexpressed, that in
view of
the facts
that
the possessor
had trucked
the
cattle
some distance,
sold
them through another
at
a
bona fide
auction,
that
the wiser course was to leave
the transaction
closed
to prevent
the inconvenience,
even disruption
of
the
flow of
commerce.
As to the court's suggestion that voidable title
passed, it need only be pointed out that the first
parties contemplated a cash transaction, of which there
was no waiver.
A recent Georgia decision states the new rule in
this fashion:
"Where one, under a contract of sale
(to sell?) gives to another unrestricted and unqualified
possession
of
personal
property
to deal with and use as
his own a bona fide purchaser for value from such per"
son in possession divests such owner of his title . . 18
The court then lessened the force of its assertion by
indicating that additionally some elements of estoppel
must intervene.
Yet why indeed should estoppel intervene?
Particularly why should estoppel as apparent
authority or apparent ownership, or either apparent
authority or apparent ownership as doctrines differing
slightly from estoppel, be summoned to protect the
bona fide purchaser when it or they do not logically
fit the facts?
A further rule is needed to give expression
to a good body of
decisions
and surely
to the
needs of
stable
commerce in
the particular
and fluid
commerce in the aggregate.
Let the duty of vigilance
be cast
upon the
original
party
when pursuant
to a
contract to sell he delivers possession.
As to the
bona fide purchaser let the transaction be the same
as a completed sale.19
The suggestion o-f the Ward case (supra) was followed in Blount v. Bainbridge, 20 where a directed verdict
of
the lower court
in
favor
of
the plaintiff
was
reversed.
In
the
lower court
directed
verdict
went
for the plaintiff on the grounds that "one cannot be a
18 - Capital Automobile Co. v.

Ward, 54 Ga. App. 873, 189 S. E. 713, 1936.
19 - See 25 Col. L.R. 129 where it is suggested that the seller beware.

bona fide purchaser (sic) . . . where he takes the property without any indicia of ownership."
Here the intermediate party gave a worthless check for the car, subsequently placed it up for sale in a garage unknown to the
seller, who was not aware that the car was being taken
for resale.
In reversing the court feels somewhat insecure, it appears, with estoppel so grasps the "catchall" maxim, "that where one of two innocent persons must
suffer by the act of a third, he, by whose negligence it
happened, must be the sufferer."
But the obvious result
of the decision is to allow the possessor to divest the
original owner of his title, since the original owner
'put the possession of the goods in the intermediate party
in pursuance of a contract to sell.
The question to be answered, it then appears, is
whether the
doctrines
of
apparent
authority
or ownership
should be applied within their logical limits or whether
the progress of the law is in search of a new rule?
The
latter would seem true, surely desirable.
Let the seller
beware when he contracts to sell and delivers possession
in. pursuance
thereof.
The original
seller
means to divest
himself
of
his
title
upon condition
after
delivery
of
possession,
so it
is
no real
injustice
to him if
the
law ignores
the
condition
insofar
as a bona fid'e
purchaser
for
value
without
notice
is
concerned.
Commercial
transactions
would be stabilized
within
this
situation,
and consqnant with the economic theory that was responsible
for
the
negotiability
of
bills
and notes,
later
other
documents,
such stability
brings about increased
21
generally.
wealth
g'reater
commerce and thus

20 - 79 Ga. App. 99, 53 S. E. 2d 122, 1949.
21 - See Uniform Revised Sales Act, Sec. 2-401 (1) 1949 draft, in accord generally.

